James R. Rogers, Ph.D., J.D., is associate professor of political science at Texas A&M University. He specializes in political institutions and mathematical modeling. He served as editor of the Journal of Theoretical Politics from 2008 through 2013, and department head from 2008 through 2013. He has published a number of articles and a book. His articles include “A Majoritarian Basis for Judicial Countermajoritarianism” (Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2020) “Resurrecting Lochner: A Defense of Unprincipled Judicial Activism” (Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2007, with George Vanberg), “The Impact of Divided Government on Legislative Production” (Public Choice, 2005), “Empirical Determinants of Bicameral Sequence in State Legislatures,” (Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2005), “National Judicial Power and the Dormant Commerce Clause” with C. Carrubba, (Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2003), “Judicial Advisory Opinions and Legislative Outcomes” (American Journal of Political Science, 2002, with G. Vanberg) and “Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling Game of Judicial-Legislative Interaction,” (American Journal of Political Science, 2001). Additional articles have been published in American Journal of Political Science 1998, 1999, Legislative Studies Quarterly 2003, 2005, Journal of Theoretical Politics 2001 2020, Public Choice, 2002, 2005, The Tax Lawyer, 2000, and Creighton Law Review 1999. The book, Institutional Games and the Supreme Court (with Jon Bond and Roy Flemming) was published in 2006. Rogers contributed three chapters to the book.